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ABSTRACT
The predictions of collusion- and efficiency-based static
equilibrium explanations of inter-industry profitability
differences are developed and tested using intra-industry
data on 70 US Internal Revenue Service minor manufacturing
industries in 1963 and 1972. The 1963 data favor
collusion-based models, while the 1972 estimates are
inconsistent with both paradigms. Patterns of
profitability are radically different (in complex ways
apparently unrelated to cyclical forces or the Phase II
price controls) in these two years. These findings call
into question the value of single-year inter-industry
studies and suggest the potential importance of panel data
and dynamic disequilibrium models in industrial economics.
February 1985
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I. Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Joe Bain (1951), the existence of a
positive, but typically weak correlation between concentration and accounting
measures of profitability has been accepted as an important stylized fact of
industrial economics. Until relatively recently, this fact was almost
universally rationalized by means of the Differential Collusion Hyeothesis
(DCH):
Industries differ in the effectiveness with which sellers are able
to limit competition by tacit or explicit collusion. Collusion is
more likely to be effective, and profitability is more likely to be
above competitive levels, the higher are concentration and barriers
to entry (as defined by Bain (1956)).
This hypothesis has inspired a multitude of cross-section studies relating
industry-level measures of concentration, of conditions of entry, and of
other factors thought likely to affect the effectiveness of collusion to
various measures of industry profitability. (See Weiss (1974) and Scherer
(1980, ch. 9) for overviews of this literature.) Most of these efforts have
produced results broadly consistent with the DCH, with statstical weaknesses
generally rationalized in terms of the difficulty of measuring key variables
(especially conditions of entry) with great precision.
A decade ago, Harold Demsetz (1973, 1974) proposed an alternative
explanation of the positive correlation between concentration and
profitability, the Differential Efficiency Hypothesis (DEH):
Effective collusion is rare; effective tacit collusion is virtually
nonexistent. Industries differ in the importance of long-lived
efficiency differences among sellers. Where these differences are
unimportant, concentration and accounting profitability will be
low. Where efficiency differences are important, the most
efficient firms will grow large relative to their rivals and will
earn Ricardian rents based on their lower costs. Both
concentration and profitability will thus be high in such cases.
If this hypothesis is correct, seller behavior in the absence of explicit
cartel arrangements can be analyzed using competitive or non-cooperative
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models, issues of entry barriers and entry deterrence do not arise, and
elements of market structure central to DCH-based analysis can be ignored.,
The DEH also implies that antitrust should abandon its historic, DCH-supported
concern with market structure and limit itself to prosecution of collusive
behavior.
The present study examines the consistency of these hypotheses with
intra-industry profitability differences in US manufacturing. Demsetz (1973,
1974) conducted the first empirical examination of this sort. He has been
followed by a host of subsequent authors, including Carter (1978), Caves and
Pugel (1980), Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984), Daskin (1983), Long (1982),
Porter (1979), Round (1975), Ravenscraft (1983), and Schmalensee (1985).2 The
strategy in much of this work, which is also employed here, has been to focus
on the inter-industry relation between seller concentration and various
parameters of industry-specific distributions of profitability and market
share. (Scherer (1980, ch. 9), Brozen (1982), and Daskin (1983) provide
contrasting summaries of this literature.)
Most previous empirical comparisons of the DEH and the DCH have not
employed formal models of industry behavior under alternative hypotheses. As
a consequence, it is often unclear whether the empirical results obtained are
consistent with one, both, or neither of these hypotheses. Accordingly, I
begin in Section II by analyzing simple equilibrium models that serve to
clarify the intra-industry and inter-industry implications of the DEH, the
DCH, and a hybrid hypothesis combining the key features of both. The goal of
this analysis is not to develop a full-blown structural model of the
determinants of accounting profitability. The aim is less ambitious (and, I
would argue, more realistic): to use simple models to identify critical
testable predictions of these alternative world-views. I am concerned here
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with empirical regularities and stylized facts, not structural coefficients.
Section III describes the data used in this study. The same industries
are examined in 1963 and 1972, two cyclically comparable years. This design
was chosen to permit both evaluation of the stability of key relationships and
analysis of industry-level changes over time. Section IV presents the results
of estimating intra-industry profitability relations, taking explicit account
both of the aggregation of firms into size classes in the (U.S. Internal
Revenue Service) data employed and of plausible patterns of
heteroscedasticity.
Section V presents the results of inter-industry analyses for 1963 and
1972 of the levels of key industry-specific parameters, along with an
evaluation of the consistency of the DEH and the DCH with the main features of
these data. Intra-industry estimates are explicitly treated as measuring the
unknown industry-level parameters of interest with error. Section VI employs
the same estimation technique to describes the pattern of parameter changes
between 1963 and 1972, and Section VII summarizes the main findings of this
study and their implications for future research.
IiImEglications of Alternative- Hvotheses
Two central features of the DEH, which should be present in any formal
model designed to reveal the implications of that hypothesis, are the
dependence of market shares on efficiency differences and the independence of
seller behavior and market concentration. In contrast, a central feature of
the DCH is the dependence of seller behavior on market concentration. I also
take as a central feature of what I term the pure' DCH the lack of a general
relation between market share and differential efficiency within industries.
In at least some textbook versions of the DCH, mergers, historical accidents,
and random shocks are stressed as sources of concentration, rather than
-_-._11^-1(--11-I- -.-
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differential efficiency or, except for very small firms, economies of scale.
(See, for instance, the discussion in Scherer (1980, ch. 4).) I begin by
deriving the implications of the DEH for the parameters of a simple intra-
industry profitability equation. I then explore the implications of the pure
DCH for that equation. The Section concludes with an analysis of the
implications of a hybrid DEH/DCH model, in which shares reflect efficiency
differences and concentration facilitates collusion.
A. The Pure DEH
This relation between market share and differential efficiency under the
DEH is basically a long-run relation, since an efficiency-enhancing
innovation's full impact on the innovator's market share is usually not felt
until capacity has been expanded or modified. To explore the inter-industry
implications of the DEH, it is thus natural to focus on long-run equilibria
that reflect the presence of efficiency differences. Moreover, while one
cannot expect all industries in any data set to be in long-run equilibrium, it
seems reasonable in the absence of a suitable dynamic theory of disequilibrium
to treat deviations from long-run equilibrium as random in cross-section data.
This is, of course, the standard practice in the cross-section literature in
industrial economics.
I thus consider an industry in long-run equilibrium in which N firms sell
a homogeneous product. Suppose that all have attained minimum efficient scale
and hence face constant long-run average costs. (Most studies of scale
economies have concluded that firms generally need relatively small market
shares to be in this position; see Scherer (1980, ch. 4) for a survey.) Let
there be long-lived efficiency differences among these firms, so that c c2
C ... I co, with at least one inequality strict, where c is firm i's unit
cost. 3 Unit cost should not be interpreted in narrow process efficiency terms
here. A firm with a superior product may simply be more efficient in the
production of the Lancastrian characteristics it supplies to an existing
market. While major product innovations that yield substantial
differentiation and create something approaching a new market cannot be
sensibly modeled as simply reducing costs, it seems reasonable to think of
minor differences among products in cost/efficiency terms for purposes of
formal analysis of profitability.
Adoption of the DEH as a working assumption rules out collusive behavior.
But I do not think that as a logical matter it requires pure price-taking
behavior. Firms with large shares of industry capacity or output should not
simply be assumed to ignore the effects of their actions on market price. It
seems uch more plausible to begin with the basic assumption of non-
cooperative behavior, under which each fire simply makes its best (most
profitable) response to its rivals' actions. As we are concerned with long-
run equilibria, investment in productive capacity becomes a central decision
variable. This is in effect an output choice, which suggests that Cournot
equilibria are the most relevant. More formally, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)
have recently shown that non-cooperative capacity decisions, followed by non-
cooperative (Bertrand) price competition yield Cournot outcomes.
Accordingly, let us explore the implications of the DEH by examining
Cournot equilibria with cost differences. (As is noted below, the fundamental
behavioral assumption here is that all firms, in all industries, behave
identically; that behavior need not be Cournot). The economic profit of a
typical fire is given by
i = P(q+4q) - c]q 1 , (1)
where P is market price, P(Q) is the inverse demand function, and q Q - q,
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is the total output of firm i's rivals. Firm i's first-order condition, with
rivals' output treated as exogenous, can be written as follows:
(P - c) = ePq1/Q, (2)
where E -1/[(aQ/8P)(P/Q)] is the reciprocal of the industry elasticity of
demand. Multiplication of (2) by q yields firm i's economic profit in
equilibrium. If firm i employs assets worth K*, and if the normal,
competitive rate of return on invested capital relevant to the industry is p,
firm i's accounting profit is given by
ira = K1 + e(q/Q) (Pq). (3)
Finally, letting si q/Q be firm i's market share and v Pq±/KI be
its revenue/capital ratio, one can divide (3) by K to obtain a simple
equation involving the accounting rate of return on assets:
r, = A + B(sivi), (4)
where, under the DEH, A = , the competitive rate of return, and B = e, the
reciprocal of the market elasticity of demand. One can think of A as the rate
of return corresponding to a zero market share. The smallest firms actually
operating in any industry will thus generally have rates of return in excess
of A under the DEH. The size of this excess may even be positively related to
concentration.4 While equation (4) flows directly from the DEH, one need not
accept that hypothesis to view (4) as a natural specification to employ in
investigations of intra-industry profitability differences. (Note in
particular that the presence of v gives the independent and dependent
variables the same units.) It is employed as such in what follows.
Under DEH, as described above, both A and B should be positive for all
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industries. Further, neither parameter should be correlated (positively or
negatively) with seller concentration across industries. Under the DEH,
variations of A across industries ought mainly to reflect differences in risk
and in accounting biases, while variations in B should mainly reflect
differences in demand elasticities. To obtain an alternative measure of
large-firm profitability advantage that should be correlated with
concentration, define RA as the difference between an industry's average rate
of return, R, and its intercept parameter, A. Then, using equation (4), the
DEH implies
N N
RA (E a,/E Ki) - A = veH, (5)
i=l i=l
where v (PQ/E K) and H E (s) z is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of
seller concentration. RA should be positive for all industries under the DEH,
and it should be positively correlated with most concentration measures,
especially when differences in capital intensity are controlled for. Since e
varies across industries, however, one cannot expect the correlation between
RA and concentration to be particularly strong.
B. The Pure DCH
Under what I have called the pure DCH, market shares are not determined
by differences in efficiency. Under this hypothesis, estimation of (4) should
still yield positive values of A. But, since share and profitability are not
systematically related, the distribution of B and RA across industries should
have a mean of approximately zero. Inter-industry differences in these
parameters would reflect accounting quirks and historical accidents.
There is no reason why B should be correlated with concentration under
the DCH, but the implications regarding A and RA are less clear. On the one
- -
hand, if industries differ in the importance of barriers to entry, but
barriers to mobility (Caves and Porter (1977)) are generally unimportant,
collusive behavior will raise the profits of all firms together. With market
shares and concentration unrelated to efficiency differences, A will be
positively correlated with concentration in cross-section, but RA (which may
be positive or negative in any particular industry) will not be. On the other
hand, a positive correlation between RA and seller concentration is also
consistent with the pure DCH. To see this, suppose (following Porter (1979))
that in industry has two strategic groups: one in which market shares are
small and into which entry is free, and one in which established sellers are
protected by barriers to entry and mobility. Sellers in the first group will
earn only competitive returns, while the DCH implies that if (and only if) the
second group is concentrated, its members will earn monopoly rents, and the
industry average rate of return will be supracompetitive. If this two-group
structure is typical, RA will be positively related to concentration in cross-
section, while A will not be. To summarize, the pure DCH predicts that will
be uncorrelated with concentration, while either A, or RA, or possibly both
will be positively correlated with concentration in cross-section.
C. A DEH/DCH Hybrid
Since both the DEH and the DCH seem rather special, it is important to
investigate the implications of DEH/DCH models, in which shares are related to
differential efficiency and seller concentration facilitates collusion. To do
this, I generalize the Cournot model developed above, using the conjectural
variation formalism to describe possible collusive equilibria. If Xl is firm
i's conjectural derivative, 8a1 /3qi, equation (4) can written as
ri = + [(l+Xk)e](siv). (6)
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It is easy to show that all else (including rivals' total output) equal, the
higher is X, the lower is firm i's output. In other words, the higher is X,
the more firm i restricts output in equilibrium. Under the DEH/DCH, one would
expect the X to be positive and to be generally larger the more concentrated
is the industry considered.
If Xi = X for all firms in some industry, equation (6) implies
immediately that estimation of (4) should yield A = , B = e(l+k), and RA =
evH(l+X). If, in addition, X is constant across industries, or at least
uncorrelated with concentration, the implications of this model are
indistinguishable from those of the pure DEH. Under the DEH/DCH, however, X
should be positively correlated with concentration across industries. Then A,
B, and RA should be positive, A should be independent of concentration, and
both B and RA should be positively correlated with concentration.
There is no strong theoretical or empirical support for the assumption
that the Xi are equal within industries, of course. Clarke and Davies (1982)
have proposed the alternative assumption X = (1-s)/s1, with a positively
correlated with concentration. (See also Long (1982) and Clarke, Davies, and
Waterson (1984).) Under this assumption, equation (6) becomes
r = Q+aevi] + [(1-c)e(sv). (7)
This version of the DEH/DCH thus implies that greater seller concentration
should be associated with higher estimates of A and lower estimates of B. The
main rationale for the Clarke-Davies assumption appears to be that as a 4 1
(with rising marginal cost), the equilibrium described by (7) converges to the
maximization of total industry profit.
While total industry profit may be a plausible cartel objective function
when side payments are possible, however, it does not seem especially
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plausible when, as in the U.S., such payments are essentially impossible.
Moreover, maximization of total industry profit requires small, inefficient
firms to be the main restrictors of output, and the inverse relation between
st and Xi in the Clarke-Davies assumption imposes this pattern on all
imperfectly collusive equilibria (i.e., those with a<l). But this pattern
seems inconsistent with most descriptions of the actual behavior of imperfect
cartels. (See almost any recent discussion of behavioral differences within
OPEC, for instance.5 ) The Clarke-Davies assumption also runs counter to
relevant cooperative and non-cooperative theory. If, (loosely) following the
widely-employed Nash model of bargaining as a cooperative game without side
payments, one examines the conditions for maximizing the product of the firms'
profits, it is easy to show that the optimium can be represented as a
conjectural variation equilibrium in which firms with lower costs have higher
X's. On the non-cooperative side,
oligopoly that small
it follows from Stigler's (1964) model
firms run a lower risk of detection and punishment
of
than
large firms if they fail to do their "f
thus conclude that a positive relation
than a negative relation of the sort pos
To explore the implications of such
holds for some industry, so that eq
homoscedastic- disturbance distributed in
the correct specification. To focus
suppose that v = v for all i. Finall
are linear in the si, so that X = X +
firms in the industry, and is some
employed to estimate equation (4), a
expectations of the estimated parameters
air share' of output
between s, and X is
tulated by Clarke and
a relation, suppose
uation (6), with the
dependently of the X1
on the influence of
y, assume that the X,
Ys 1-(1/N)], where N
restriction. I
more plausible
Davies.
that the DEH/DCH
addition of a
and (sivi), is
concentration,
have mean X and
is the number of
constant. Then if least squares is
bit of algebra yields the following
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E(A) = + ev[YH 2-E(s,) 3 ]/[NH-1],
E(B) = e(l+X) + eN 2E(s1)3-2NH+1]/[N(NH-1)],
E(RA) = + evH(1+X) + evY[E(s,)3-(H/N)] - E(A),
where H = E(st) 2, as above.
If the distribution of the s,
lognormal, which is commonly treated
distributions, it is easy to show
(1963), ch. 2) that the expected
substitution in equations (8) yields
E(A) = - evYH2,
can be adequately approximated by the
as a workable approximation to firm size
(using results from Aitcheson and Brown
value of E(s1)3 is NH3. Making this
(9a)
E(B) = e(l+X) + e[YN 3H3 -2NH+13/[N(NH-1),
E(RA) = evH(1+X) + evYNH3+H2-(H/N)].
(9b)
(9c)
As an empirical matter, N is at best weakly (negatively) correlated with
concentration. (See, for instance, Schmalensee (1977), esp. footnote 1.) And
it is easy to show that the second terms on the right of (9b) and (9c) are
positive and increasing in H for H > /N, its lower bound.
Equations (9) thus imply that if is generally positive and independent
of concentration, A should be negijively correlated with concentration in
cross-section, though the correlation may be weak, while the positive
correlation between concentration and both B and RA will be stronger than if 
= 0. If is large, A could be negative for highly concentrated industries,
but B and RA should be positive in all cases. In what follows I treat these as
the most likely outcomes under the DEH/DCH.
Equations (9) also show that negative values of , which I have argued
(8a)
(8b)
(8c)
____·
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are relatively implausible, will tend to induce a positive correlation between
concentration and A and to weaken the positive correlations between
concentration and B and between concentration and RA. If is generally
negative and large, these latter correlations could become negative, producing
results like those implied by equation (7). If <O is the norm, A should be
positive in all cases, but negative values of B and RA could be observed in
highly concentrated industries. Since e may vary substantially among
industries (along with v and ), one cannot expect any of the correlations
predicted by this hybrid DEH/DCH model to be particularly strong.
III. Data Employed
The data employed in this study cover U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
minor manufacturing industries for 1963 and 1972. I chose to use years for
which Census of Manufactures data could be used to measure seller
concentration. These particular Census years were selected because data for
them were readily available, they were far enough apart in time for changes in
industry-level variables to reflect changes in their fundamental determinants,
and because they were comparable in terms of the business cycle.6 Both 1963
and 1972 were relatively prosperous years. The overall unemployment rate was
5.5% in both years, while the civilian unemployment rate was 5.7% in 1963 and
5.6% in 1972.' Real GNP grew 4.6% during 1963 and 5.7% during 1972. Inflation
was somewhat higher in 1972 than in 1963: the 6NP deflator rose only 1.5%
during 1963 but rose 4.9% during 1972.
Focusing on the manufacturing sector, the two years studied again appear
quite similar. The Federal Reserve Board's measure of capacity utilization
was 83.5% in both periods. Real 6NP originating in manufacturing rose 7.7% in
1963 and 10.4% in 1972. The corresponding implicit deflator fell 1.1% during
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1963 and rose only 0.3% during 1972. Almost all the inflation that worried
policy-makers during 1972 occurred outside the manufacturing sector.
Perhaps the most obvious difference between 1963 and 1972 is the
operation of Phase II price controls during 1972. But there are at least
three reasons for concluding that this is unimportant for the present study.
First, the macroeconomic literature suggests that these controls did not have
large effects on the economy as a whole; see, for instance, Dornbusch and
Fischer (1981, pp. 566-67) and the references they cite. Second, Appendix A
reports the results of a time-series analysis indicating that the Phase II
controls had an insignificant effect on manufacturing profits. Third,
Appendix A also reports the results of a small-scale study of the time-series
behavior of the relation between firm size and profitability in US
manufacturing. This study, undertaken to test for the possibility that the
Phase II controls were enforced mainly against leading firms, giving their
smaller rivals artificial competitive advantages, does not find 1972 to be an
outlier in any relevant sense.
Data by industry and by industry-specific asset size-class for Internal
Revenue Service minor industries for 1972 were mainly obtained from the
Project on Industry and Company Analysis (PICA) at the Harvard Graduate School
of Business Administration. In order to reduce well-known easurement problems
associated with very small fires and to reduce the importance of scale-related
cost differences (the presence of which would tend to bias our results In
favor of the DEH) in the data, data on fires with assets below $500,000 were
excluded. In order to have at least four usable size classes for eact
industry, five IRS industries (2380, 2398, 2899, 3860, and 3870) were ther
dropped from the sample. Nany of the remaining industries are sufficiently
broadly defined that they should be thought of as including several markets
with at least some supply-side links. A final industry (3990, miscellaneous
_~~~1.~~~-1__ 11^_1___ --- .------
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manufactured products, except ordinance, manufacturing not allocable) was
dropped because the markets it included seemed unlikely to be at all closely
linked. Our final sample consisted of 70 IRS minor industries, each with at
least four usable size classes. The maximum number of usable classes was
eight; the mean number was 6.8.
Data for 1963 IRS industries was provided by Allan J. Daskin, from the
data set assembled for use in his dissertation (Daskin (1983)). These data
were aggregated (size-class by size-class) to conform to the 1972 industry
definitions, following the 1968 IRS Sourcebook of Statistics of Income. All
1963 industries had between five and nine usable size classes, with a mean of
8.3 classes per industry.
For each size-class for each industry, I compiled the number of firms,
total assets, pre-tax profits plus interest payments, and business receipts.
The ratio of total pre-tax returns (profits plus interest) to total assets
employed was used as the accounting rate of return, r. This measure avoids
the distorting effects of differences in leverage and effective income
taxation. (Daskin (1983) reports that the effects in this context of the use
of after-tax returns are negligible.) Like all accounting measures of
profitability, r is inherently imprecise. The inter-industry equations
discussed below include controls (crude ones, to be sure) for some frequently-
discussed accounting biases. More importantly, however, it is not clear why
one should expect the most obvious infirmities of accounting data to do
anything more than add noise to our estimates. In particular, it is not
obvious why accounting biases should be correlated with concentration in such
a way as to produced biased estimates of key cross-section coefficients.
Similarly, the conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960's undoubtedly serves
to lower the quality of the 1972 data, but it is not clear why it should bias
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estimates of relations involving concentration.
The following variables were computed for each IRS minor manufacturing
industry in 1963 and 1972:
R = Ratio of pre-tax profits plus interest payments to total assets
for all firms with assets above $500,000
CONC = Weighted average, using value-added weights, of four-firm
concentration ratios of constituent 4-digit Census industries.
AD/K = Ratio of advertising outlays to total assets.
PQ/K = Ratio of business receipts to total assets.
DDUR = 1 - DNDR = 1 for durable goods industries, zero otherwise.
DCON = 1 - DPRO = 1 for consumer goods industries, zero otherwise.
The means, standard deviations, and inter-year correlations of the first four
of these variables are shown in Table 1. Those figures seem generally
consistent with the presumption that 1963 and 1972 are comparable years. They
also indicate that dramatic changes between these years were relatively rare.@
The correlations between R and the corresponding industry-wide rates of
return were above .99 in both years. If one thinks of IRS minor industries as
including multiple markets, observed rates of return must be thought of as
asset-weighted averages of rates of return in those markets. Thus CONC should
ideally also be computed using (net) asset weights; value-added weights
seemed the closest readily available substitute. The advertising-sales ratio,
AD/PQ, is often treated as a proxy for product differentiation under the DCH.
The correlations between AD/K, which seems slightly preferable because it has
the same units as the other variables, and AD/PD exceeded .96 in both years.
AD/K is also the more natural variable to use as a rough correction for
advertising-related accounting biases; see Demsetz (1979). The variable PQ/K
serves both to control for differences in capital intensity and as a rough
correction for accounting biases in asset valuation during inflation. I do
__II__IDEl____1-__ _-
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not attempt to provide structural interpretations of the coefficients of AD/K
and PQ/K; these variables are included as controls and for descriptive
purposes.
Similarly, in the interests of providing an adequate description of the
data, it seemed desirable to examine differences between industries producing
durable and nondurable goods and between industries producing consumer and
producer goods. I used Ornstein's (1977, Appendix B) classification of four-
digit Census industries in 1967, along with 1963 value-added weights and the
correspondence between 1963 and 1972 IRS definitions to classify the sample
industries along these lines. Seventeen of the 70 industries in the sample
were found to produce mainly durable goods, and 22 were classified as consumer
goods industries by this procedure.'
IV._ Intra-Industry_Estimation
In order to compare values of A, B, and RA across industries, equation
(4) must be estimated for each industry in the sample. This is not a
completely straightforward task, since (4) relates to individual firms, while
the data are for groups of firms within asset-based size-classes. Only Daskin
(1983) seems to have recognized that one cannot obtain unbiased or even
consistent estimates by simply substituting size-class averages into equations
like (4). He dealt with the problem by estimating an intra-industry equation
linear in profits and assets, for which there is no problem of aggregation
bias. Unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret the parameters of Daskin's
equation in terms of the hypotheses of interest here.
The approach taken in this study is to aggregate (4) from firm to size-
class data explicitly and to substitute consistent estimates of the
unobservable quantities (defined below) that appear as a consequence of
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aggregation. Consider size class c in some industry. Suppose it has Nc
firms, and let the subscript ci" denote the it h firm in class c. Multiplying
equation (4) by the firem's total assets and adding a disturbance term yields
a, = AK , + BP(q,)2 + c,i. (10)
The basic equation for size-class average rates of return is then obtained by
summing over the firms in class c and dividing by total assets in the class:
N, N=
r= - E a=,/S K, a/K= = A + B(4f=9v.) + u. (11)
i=1 i=1
The new variables in this equation are defined as follows:
N, N, N=
f, - N, (q,)2/( q)2 N (q,)2/(q,)z (12a)
s9 -(q=/N=)/Q, (12b)
vc = Pqc/Kc, (12c)
Nc
u - E zc,/Kc. (12d)
i=1
The unobservable quantity f equals one if and only if all firms in size class
c have the same sales. In general f equals one plus the ratio of the sample
variance of the qci to the square of their sample mean. It thus is an
indicator of the importance of intra-class differences in market share.
In order to handle the unobservability of the f, I assume that intra-
class differences in assets are as important as those in sales:
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N,
N. E (K ) 2 /(K) 2. (13)
i=l1
This assumption is needed here because size-class boundaries relate to assets,
not sales. A' sufficient (but not necessary) condition for (13) to be
satisfied is that within a given industry, all firms in each size class have
the same revenue/capital ratio. Given (13), the f are estimated using N.,
K., and the values of size-class boundaries. The procedure employed is based
on the assumption that assets of firms within each class are drawn from a
class-specific density function linear in assets. Details are given (and an
alternative approach based on the lognormal distribution is discussed) in
Appendix B.
A second problem in estimating (11) with size-class data is that
aggregation may produce differences in the variances of the u. To deal with
possible heteroscedasticity among the u within industries, I employ two
alternative, bounding assumptions about the distribution of the s.c in (10:).
Perhaps the most natural of these is that the standard deviation of ec is
equal to aK_ for all i and c, where is an industry-specific constant.
Under this assumption, the variance of u is given by
N.
2(U.) = 02 E (K,) 2 /(Kc) 2 = a2(f /N,). (14)
i=1
Division of (11) by (f¢/N) 1'2 yields what is referred to below as the CRS
estimating equation, because it embodies the assumption of stochastic constant
returns to scale:
r (N /f,)' s = A(N./f.)' 2 + B[s,v,(f,N,)'23 + $,. (15)
The variance of $g is 2 for all classes in a given industry if (14) holds.
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The literature on the effects of scale on the time-series and cross-
section variability of firms' rates of return suggests an alternative to the
CRS specification. These studies generally find that the standard deviation
of rates of return declines with firm size, with the decline less rapid than
that of (K1 )-1 /2 . (See Prais (1976, pp. 92-98) and Daskin (1983) for
overviews of this literature.) This suggests that the standard deviation of
e.c is generally equal to a(Kc~)b, where is as before and 1/2 X 1. The
CRS specification assumes b = 1. Since b is unknown and may vary from
industry to industry and from year to year, I deal with the possibility that b
is less than unity by exploring the implications of the alternative bounding
assumption b = 1/2. Under this assumption the variance of u is simply
o2(uC) = a2/K. (16)
Division of (11) by (K=) -'' 2 yields the IRS estimating equation, which
embodies the assumption of stochastic increasing returns to scale:
re(K) / 2 = A(Kc)1/' + BS9v.fc(K=) ' / 23 + c. (17)
The parameter estimates obtained by employing the CRS and IRS
specifications with 1963 and 1972 data are summarized in Table 2. The
statistics given under the heading 'Sample Coefficients' are self-
explanatory.1 0 Those statistics indicate that essentially all estimates of A
are positive in both years, while estimates of B and RA have both signs in
both years. The majority of estimates of B (59X) and RA (56%) are positive in
1963, while negative values (66Z of B's and 69% RA's) are the rule in 1972.
Perhaps the most striking feature of this Table is the sharp difference
between the 1963 and 1972 estimates. Table 1 shows that on average R (= RA +
A) changed little between these years, but Table 2 reveals that A rose broadly
and substantially, while B and RA generally fell.
_1_________111____1-11_--
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The first two statistics given under the heading Probability Levels"
are the significance levels obtained in standard X2 tests of the indicated
null hypotheses. Except for estimates of B under the CRS specification, these
indicate that the null hypotheses that the underlying parameters or their
1963-1972 changes are the same across industries can be confidently rejected.
That is, the intra-industry estimates of the coefficients of equation (4)
provide information on what seem to be real inter-industry differences.
The statistics under the heading Population Estimates" in Table 2
provide summary information on the importance of those differences. Following,
for instance, Swamy (1970, esp. Sect 5), if b is the estimate of some true
parameter, pj, for industry j, one can write
bj= + = + v +  (18)
Here qj is the sampling error associated with b. It is unobservable, but it
can be treated as having mean zero and standard deviation equal to the
standard error of b5, which we denote (qj). If p is the mean of the
population from which the pj are drawn, so that the v have mean zero, an
unbiased estimator of the variance of the population distribution of the p is
given by
N M
¢2(v) = E (b - 6)2/(M-1) - E o2 (qj)/M, (19)
j=1 j=1
where E is the sample mean of the b, and M is the number of industries.
Given a2 (v), the precision-weighted average of the b provides an efficient
estimate of :
N H
= £ bj/tE 2(v)+a 2(qS)]}/ E {1/o 2(v)+ff2(R)]}. (20)
j=1 j=1
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A comparison of p with its large-sample variance, l/E{l/o 2 (v)+ 2 (q)]},
yields a large-sample X2 test of the null hypothesis that the population mean
of the p is zero.
The statistics computed using equations (18) - (20) reinforce the
impression of considerable inter-industry variation in underlying parameters.
Population standard deviations appear large relative to population means,
especially for RA and B. (Equation (19) yielded a negative estimate of (v)
for B under the CRS specification, reflecting the large standard errors of the
corresponding parameter estimates.) Population means differ significantly
from zero, and the changes in estimated values between 1963 and 1972 seem to
reflect real changes in underlying population distributions.
I postpone discussion of the consistency of the results in Table 2 with
the models of Section II until after an examination of the key inter-industry
correlations identified by those models.
V. Inter-Industry Estimation: Levels
In order to estimate cross-section relations involving A, B, and RA
efficiently, one must take explicit account of the fact that the estimates
from intra-industry regressions measure the true underlying parameters with
error. If pj is the true value of some such parameter for industry j, and Zj
and 8 are vectors of industry-specific explanatory variables and inter-
industry coefficients, respectively, a typical inter-industry equation can be
written as follows:
bj = j, + , = Z'6 + ( + ). (21)
The gj and the Aj are assumed to be independent. If the gj have common
variance 2(4),21 the variance of the jth error term in equation (21) is
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[a 2 (t)+a 2 (j,)]. Since the sampling variances of the b differ in general,
application of ordinary least squares to (21) would yield inefficient
estimates of 6.
This problem has been treated in general terms by Hanushek (1974) and
Saxonhouse (1977); Long (1982) and Daskin (1983) have previously allowed for
this source of heteroscedasticity in this context. In order to obtain
efficient estimates of , one needs a consistent estimate of 2(t). Since the
standard errors of the b can be treated as known, such estimates can be
obtained by applying least squares to (21), either as it stands or after
division by the (qj). Because these two regressions often yield rather
different estimates of 2(t) and because estimates of are in many cases
sensitive to the estimate of 2(t) employed, I used an iterative fixed-point
approach to the estimation of that variance, the details of which are
presented in Appendix C. Weighted least squares estimation was then used to
obtain efficient estimates of &.
Table 3 presents weighted least squares estimates of the cross-section
relation between concentration and A, B, and RA. For comparison purposes,
estimates of the relation between between concentration and R are also
presented. The statistics labeled "Basic Model' refer to a simple bivariate
model in which CONC is the only independent variable, while in the "Full
Model" the variables AD/K and PQ/K are added to control for advertising and
capital intensity differences. All equations estimated included intercept
terms, which are of little interest and hence are not reported. Equations
labeled 'Pooled' were estimated by simply stacking the weighted regressions
corresponding to the CRS and IRS specification. (In no case could the null
hypothesis of coefficient identity be rejected at any reasonable significance
level.) Since the CRS and IRS parameter estimates cannot be considered
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independent, the 'Pooled" estimates have no claim to optimality. They merely
provide convenient summary information.
The first measure of goodness of fit presented in Table 3, R2-Wtd., is
the R2 statistic of the weighted regression used to estimate 8. A second
measure, R2-Raw, is the square of the correlation between predicted and actual
values of b. The second measure can be negative; the first must lie between
zero and one. Chow tests for coefficient stability applied to equations
involving A, B, or RA provided no evidence of significant coefficient
differences between durable goods and nondurable goods industries or between
consumer goods industries and producer goods industries.1 2
The Prob. Level' statistics in Table 3 are the significance levels of F-
tests of the null hypotheses of equal slope coefficients in 1963 and 1972,
with intercepts allowed to differ in light of the results shown in Table 2.
These statistics generally cast appreciable doubt on this null hypothesis.
That is, not only do the average values of A, B, and RA differ between 1963
and 1972, but their correlations with concentration and other industry
characteristics (themselves relatively stable, as Table 1 indicates) appear to
differ as well. The instability detected in Table 2 is apparently quite
fundamental.
Coefficient instability is most clearly present in Table 3 in the
equations involving R, industry-level profitability. Estimates of both Models
for 1963 yield the traditional weak positive relation between concentration
and profitability; the estimated coefficients imply that an increase in CONC
from .20 to .85 would raise R by only about one standard deviation. But in
1972 there is no visible relation at all between CONC and R. This is
consistent with eiss's (1974) observation (based on studies using pre-1970's
data) that the concentration/profitability relation tends to weaken n
inflationary periods, though (as was noted in Section III) the inflation
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rate in manufacturing was only 1.3 percentage points higher in 1972 than in
1963. The implications of the instability revealed in the first column of
statistics in Table 3 for the reliability of conclusions drawn from single-
year cross-section studies are obvious and depressing.
The remaining regressions in Table 3, none of which have such explanatory
power, indicate that the relations between concentration and A, B, and RA are
also likely to differ between the two years studied. On the other hand, the
Basic and Full Models and the CRS and IRS specifications generally produce
very similar estimates. Since the DEH and the DCH predict only the existence
of statistically weak relations (because of inter-industry variation in E), it
is appropriate to apply looser than usual standards for rejecting null
hypotheses of no relation. With this in mind, A and RA appear to be
positively correlated with concentration in 1963. In 1972, A appears to be
negatively correlated with concentration, while the correlation between
concentration and B appears to be positive. There is not a hint here of a
non-zero correlation between B and concentration in 1963 or between RA and
concentration in 1972.
Table 4 summarizes the implications of the DEH, the DCH, and the DEH/DCH
developed in Section II, along with the corresponding statistical findings
from Tables 2 and 3. Consider first the findings for 1963. The evidence for
a positive relation between A and concentration, which is predicted only by
the pure DCH, is as strong as that for a similar relation between RA and
concentration, which is consistent with all three hypotheses and required by
the DEH and the DEH/DCH. The DEH/DCH prediction of a positive relation
between B and concentration receives absolutely no support. The correlations
with concentration in 1963 thus tend to favor the DCH as against the other two
hypotheses.
- 25 -
Similarly, the DEH and the DEH/DCH both predict positive values of B and
RA in all industries, but the 1963 estimates imply that these parameters are
nearly as likely to be negative as positive. While the estimates means of the
population distributions of both parameters are significantly different from
zero, they are small both absolutely and relative to the corresponding
estimated population standard deviations. This pattern appears consistent
only with the DCH. Results similar to these have been reported by a host of
previous authors, including Caves and Pugel (1980), Clark, Davies, and
Waterson (1984), Comanor and Wilson (1974), Daskin (1983), Long(1982), Marcus
(1969), and Porter (1979), using a variety of specifications and data sets.
It is clear from this literature as well as from Table 2 that one cannot treat
the positive intra-industry relation between profitability and market share
predicted by the DEH and the DEH/DCH as a stylized fact in US
manufacturing. 1
While the 1963 data thus favor the DCH over the DEH and the DEH/DCH, the
results obtained for 1972 are basically inconsistent with all three
hypotheses. Negative values of B and RA are the norm; the null hypotheses
that the corresponding population means are zero are decisively rejected. The
estimated population mean of B is small relative to the corresponding standard
deviation, however, so that the estimated distribution of B could perhaps be
described as approximately symmetric around zero and thus consistent with the
DCH. But the statistics for RA describe a distribution with most of its mass
below zero, and this is consistent with none of the three hypotheses.
Similarly, the clear lack of a positive correlation between RA and
concentration in 1972 is inconsistent with both the DEH and the DEH/DCH. It
would be consistent with the DCH if the correlation between A and
concentration were positive, but it is negative. The correlations involving A
and B are consistent with the DEH/DCH, but that hypothesis predicts a positive
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relation between concentration and RA, and no such relation is present. In
short, the pattern of correlations observed for 1972 is consistent with none
of the three static equilibrium hypotheses considered here.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the findings summarized in Table 4
is the striking difference between the 1963 and 1972 estimates for identically
defined industries. This difference casts doubt on the stability assumption
implicit in single-year cross-section work in industrial economics. The
results obtained here may well signal the presence of fundamental weaknesses
in the static equilibrium approach on which standard versions of both the DEH
and the DCH rest. Except in periods of unusual stability, it may be necessary
to model deviations from long-run equilibrium explicitly in order to explain
the main patterns of intra-industry and inter-industry profitability
differences. Panel data seem necessary to provide tests of such models with
adequate power.
VI. Inter-Industry Estimation: Chanqes
I had originally intended to estimate a variety of dynamic specifications
using data from 1963 and 1972 to test some DEH-based hypotheses about
relations between changes in concentration and the industry-specific
parameters analyzed in Table 3. (For instance, industries with above-average
B's in 1963 might be expected to have become more concentrated on average by
1972 as leading firms expanded to exploit cost advantages not yet fully
reflected in market share.) The evidence of coefficient instability
presented in Table 3, the dramatic changes in the distributions of industry-
specific parameters shown in Table 2, and the results of a few attempts to
estimate dynamic models indicate that the stationarity conditions necessary
for such an exercise to be sensible are simply not satisfied here.
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The pattern of changes in A, B, and RA across industries over the nine-
year period between 1963 and 1972 is nonetheless of some interest. Tables 5
and 6 present simple descriptive estimates of the Basic and Full models using
parameter changes as dependent variables and average values of CONC, AD/K, and
PQ/K as independent variables. (As Table 1 indicates, these quantities
generally change little between 1963 and 1972, and a number of experiments
make clear the futility of trying to associate changes in A, B, or RA with
changes in these three variables.) The presentation follows that in Table 3.
All estimated relations were checked for stability across sub-sets of
industries. No real evidence of differences between consumer goods
industries and producer good industries was encountered. Surprisingly,
however, Chow tests showed most versions of the Full Model (but not of the
Basic Model) to be unstable between durable goods and nondurable goods
industries. I have no supportable explanation for this basic finding or for
the related details discussed below; I present these results in part in the
hope that someone will be thereby stimulated to provide such an explanation. 3s
The estimates in Table 5 indicate that more concentrated industries
experienced smaller than average increases in A and larger than average
decreases in R. As the P-Levels reported at the bottom of the Table indicate,
durable/nondurable instability in the Full Model for A seems to be confined to
the intercept (CNST) and the coefficient of average PQ/K. (The Full Model for
R shows no significant instability of this sort; it is estimated in the same
version as the A equations entirely for purposes of comparability.) All else
equal, durable goods industries experienced smaller increases in A than
nondurable goods industries. Among durable goods industries, increases in A
are smaller the higher is capital intensity, while there is some evidence of
the opposite effect in the nondurables subsampl-e. The Full Model also
indicates that industries with higher than average advertising intensity
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experienced smaller than average increases in A, while advertising intensity
was unrelated to changes in R.
Table 6 presents a similar analysis of changes in RA and B. The Basic
Model indicates a weak tendancy for more concentrated industries to experience
larger than average declines in RA and smaller than average declines in B.
Instability in the Full Models for RA and B did not seem to be confined to a
subset of the coefficients, so that separate estimates of the Full Model are
presented in Table 6 for durable and nondurable good industries. (Recall that
there are 17 durable good industries and 53 nondurable good industries in this
sample.) All else equal, the intercept terms point to larger declines in both
RA and B for industries producing nondurables. Among the durable good
industries, higher concentration is associated with larger than average
declines in RA but had no significant effect changes in B. Among industries
producing nondurables the pattern is reversed: concentration has no effect on
changes in RA, but higher concentration is associated with smaller declines in
B among nondurables. Advertising intensity has a positive sign in all
estimates, but coefficients and significance levels vary considerably. Higher
capital intensity has a positive effect on changes in RA and B in the durables
subsample but has a negative effect on both changes among industries producing
nondurables.
There may be some simple explanation for the apparently complex pattern
of changes shown in Tables 5 and 6. But static equilibrium versions of the
DEH and the DCH do not seem likely to produce it, nor do plausible hypotheses
regarding the incidence of the Phase II price controls.
VII. Conclusions and Imelications
This essay has derived a set of testable implications of the DEH, the
DCH, and a hybrid DEH/DCH model and employed new techniques for testing those
- 30 -
To explore the impact of the Phase II price controls on manufacturing
profits, I estimated a variety of standard acroeconometric profit equations
with data for the period 1955-1970. (I excluded 1971 because the Nixon price
controls began with the imposition of the Phase I price freeze in August of
that year. Estimates also employing post-controls (1975-1982) were less
satisfactory, presumably at least in part because of the 1973-1974 oil shock
and contemporaneous changes in the definitions of the manufacturing profit and
sales series employed.) Both manufacturing sales and real 6NP originating in
manufacturing were used as measures of activity. Standard cyclical variables
were employed in these experiments, along with trend terms and HE, the rate
of growth of average gross hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory
manufacturing workers. (Unless otherwise specified, footnote 7 applies to all
data series introduced in this Appendix.) Equations based on sales
outperformed those based on GNP. Deletion of insignificant variables led to
the following standard equation, which was then estimated using data for 1955-
1970 and 1972:
wa/PQ = -.0320 - .0011 T + .1492 CU + .0004 PQ - .0031 D72 (A1)
(2.34) (11.1) (8.45) (2.69) (1.30)
RZ = .973, DW = 2.33.
Here wa/PQ is the ratio of pre-tax manufacturing profits to sales, T is a time
trend (1954 = 1), CU is the Federal Reserve Board measure of capacity
utilization in manufacturing (expressed as a fraction), APQ is the percentage
increase in manufacturing sales from the preceding year, and D72 is a dummy
variable for 1972. Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-
statistics.
The coefficient of D72 in equation (Al) is insignificant at usual levels,
II
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and its absolute value is only about a third of the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. (In the best of the equations that also used 1975-1982
data, the coefficient of D72 had a t-statistic of -0.58.) This analysis
suggests that the Phase II controls mainly affected the non-manufacturing
sectors of the economy, where most of the inflation in 1972 occurred; the
effects on total manufacturing profits were at any rate insignificant.
In order to see whether the Phase II controls produced a shift in the
relative profitability of large and small manufacturing firms in 1972, I
obtained the following variables from the IRS Statistics of Income and
Sourcebook of Statistics of Income for the 20-year period 1958-1977, which is
centered on the two years analyzed in the text:
RT = Pre-tax profits plus interest payments as a percentage of
total assets for all manufacturing firms.
RS = Pre-tax profits plus interest payments as a percentage of
total assets for manufacturing firms with assets between
$500,000 and $1,000,000.15
dR = 100x(RT - RS).
RS gives the profitability of the smallest firms considered in our detailed
analysis of 1963 and 1972. While most manufacturing firms in most years have
asset values below $500,000, the aggregates used to compute RT mainly reflect
the performance of firms with assets above $1,000,000. The variable dR thus
gives a reasonable indicator of the average importance of large-firm
profitability advantages, measured in basis points.
One might expect dR to be positive in most years, and it is in fact
positive in 16 of the 20 years in the sample. It is negative in 1972, but it
assumes uch larger negative values in 1968, 1975, and 1977. (The values of
dR in these years are as follows: 1968 = -26.7, 1972 = -4.2, 1975 = -80.1, and
1977 = -71.2.) Even if 1972 is something of an outlier, these findings do not
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point toward the Phase II price controls as the reason.
The behavior of dR over time is illustrated in Figure 1. In the first
seven years of the sample, the mean of dR is 201.6. It is worth noting that a
very large fraction of the published cross-section studies in industrial
economics use data from this period. From 1965 through 1968, dR declines
relatively steadily to -26.7. Thereafter its behavior is somewhat erratic.
The mean of dR in the last seven years of the sample is 4.3, just over 2% of
its mean in the first seven years of the sample.
In this sample, dR is negatively correlated with the rate of growth of
the implicit deflator for NP originating in manufacturing, a time trend, HE,
and RT. It is uncorrelated with CU and the rate of growth of real 6NP
originating in manufacturing, standard cyclical variables with which RT and
other measures of aggregate profitability are positively correlated. (Simple
correlations of these measures with RT are .62 and .27, respectively. See
also equation (Al), above.) This suggests that the correlation with RT
reflects accounting practice rather than economic reality.
The most satisfactory regression equation involving the variables
discussed in the preceding paragraph and natural variants thereof is the
following, where figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics:
dR = 535.2 - 38.33 HE - 22.45 RT R2 = .644 (A2)
(3.90) (5.33) (1.71) DW = 2.26
The residual for 1972 from equation (A2) is negative, but so is the residual
for 1963. And 1961, 1967, and 1968 have larger negative residuals than 1972.
The residual for 1971, the year in which price controls were first imposed, is
also negative, but it is smaller in absolute value than the negative residuals
for seven other years. When dummy variables for 1963 and 1972 are added to
this equation, the coefficient of the former is a tenth of its standard error,
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and the coefficient of the latter is equal to 1.09 times its standard error.
Once again, 1972 does not emerge as an outlier in any way that might be
attributable to the operation of the Phase II price controls.
Consider a size class including N firms with assets between a and b and
let m be reported mean assets per firm. Let K be the assets of a typical firm
in this class, assumed to be a draw from the density function g(K) with mean
p. Taking the expectation of the second-order Taylor series expansion of the
right-hand side of equation (13) about the point at which all the K = , one
obtains the asymptotic approximation employed to estimate the f:
f* = + (N-1)R]/N, (B1)
where the quantity R, which equals or exceeds unity and reflects the
population dispersion in g(K), is given by
R = E(K2 )/g2 . (Bi)
Note that for N = 1, both the true f and the approximation f* equal one for
any distribution, as there are no intra-class differences. As N e , both 4
and f* approach the population value R. The mechanics of estimating the
population ratio R depend on whether b is known or unknown.
In the largest size class in each industry, the upper bound on firm size,
b, is unknown. I deal with this by assuming that g(K) is a linear decreasing
function of K and reaches zero at K = b. For such a triangular distribution
it is easy to show that
p = (2a + b)/3, (B3)
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E(K2) = (3a2 + 2ab + b2)/6. (B4)
Setting p = m in (B3) yields an estimate of b. Substitution into (B4) and
division by m2 then produces an estimate of R.
When b is known, I assume initially that g(a) = a, g(b) = p, with ,p
0, and that g(K) is a linear function of K between these points. For such a
trapezoidal distribution,
p = u[(2a+b) + (1-w)(a+2b)]/3, (85)
where = /(a+p), and
E(K2) = [6(a+b)p-(a 2+4ab+b 2)]/6. (Sb)
For (2a+b)/3 < < (a+2b)/3, R is estimated by setting = m in (B6) and
dividing by m2. For m < (2a+b)/3, the triangular distribution o4 the
preceding paragraph is employed. For m > (a+2b)/3, g(K) is assumed to be
triangular with g(b) > 0 and g(x) = 0 for some x > a.
I experimented at some length with an alternative approach that involved
assuming a lognormal distribution of firms' assets within each industry. This
approach should be more efficient than that described above for industries
with approximately lognormal size distributions. Parameter estimates were
computed using variants of the basic maximum likelihood method for estimating
the parameters of truncated lognormal distributions; see Aitcheson and Brown
(1963, Sects. 9.2 and 9.6). Exact formulae for conditional expectations then
produced class-specific estimates of R. For most industries this approach
gave f*'s and estimates of A and B that were very close to those produced by
the method described above. In a few cases, however, involving industries
with size distributions that seemed far from lognormality, this alternative
approach yielded implausible estimates of the f,. The technique described
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above was employed because of its apparently greater robustness to substantial
departures from lognoreality.
Apendix 
Consider estimating equation (21) in the text by weighted regression,
dividing the jth observation by (wj) 1 2. For any set of positive wj, a
consistent estimate of 2(4), the unknown variance of the j, is given by
M M
v = SSR - E ( 2(qj)/wj)]/E (l/wj), (C1)
j=1 j=1
where is the number of industries, and SSR is the sum of squared residuals
from the weighted regression. Interest attaches here to weights of the form
wj = v + 2(q,) ]. (C2)
Let D equal the coefficient of variation of the wj, the ratio of the standard
deviation of these weights to their mean. For weights given by (C2), D varies
between 0 and s/m, where m is the mean of the 2 (hj) and s is their standard
deviation.
Now consider the function F, from O0,s/ml to the real line, defined
constructively as follows. Pick a non-negative initial value of v, vO. Use
(C2) to compute the corresponding vector of weights, w, and directly
calculate the initial value of D, DO. Run a weighted regression with weight
vector w and use (C1) to obtain a new value of v, which need not be non-
negative. Finally, use (C2) to compute new weights and a new value of D, D1
F(DO). Iterated weighted least squares is simply a search for a fixed point
of F.
In this study it proved very efficient computationally to employ a linear
approximation to the function F. OLS estimation of (21) yields F(O);
_1_1  __1___1_________ _
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estimation with wj = r2 (qj) yields F(s/m). Let SSRo be tne sum of squared
residuals from the first regression, and let SSRW be the sum of squared
residuals from the second. A bit of algebra establishes that if F is linear
and has a fixed point, the corresponding value of v is given by
v* = (SSR./M)[(SSR./M)-1]/E(SSR./M)-l+Yl, where (C5!
n n
E [E 2(q~)][E 1/a2(q,)]/N2 (C4)
j=l j=1
Given an estimate of a2 (4) from (C3), one can use (C2) to compute weights for
a third weighted regression. If a fixed point of F has been found, it follows
from (C1) and (C2) that the sum of squared residuals from this regression will
equal M.
This technique could not be applied to equations involving estimates of B
computed using the CRS specification; because these estimates differed little
relative to their standard errors, (C3) produced negative values of v*. (See
the discussion of Table 2 in Section II of the text.) Instead, estimates of
~2(g) derived from the IRS specification were used for all equations involving
estimates of B. (In equations involving estimates of A and RA, the CRS and
IRS estimates of g2(g) were generally nearly identical.) Otherwise, the
approach described above either yielded an approximate fixed point directly or
made it easy to obtain such a point with one additional iteration.
III
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Footnotes
I am indebted to the National Science Foundation for financial support, to
Alan J. Daskin and the PICA project at the Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration (especially Michael Spence and Marilyn Shesko) for providing
most of the data used in this study, and to Steven Postrel and, especially,
Ian Ayres for excellent research assistance. I am grateful to Ian Ayres,
William Long, and seminar audiences at Johns Hopkins and the Federal Trade
Commission for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. Only I can
be held responsible for sins of omission or commission embodied in this paper,
however.
1. There is important common ground, however. Under the DEH, one should
attempt to understand the obstacles to diffusion of knowledge that must be
present if intra-industry efficiency differences are to persist. Under
the DCH, obstacles of this sort are a subset of what Caves and Porter
(1977) have termed barriers to mobility".
2. The interesting work of Peltzman (1977, 1979) and Lustgarten (1979, 1984)
on the relation between changes in concentration and improvements in
productivity (see also Scherer (1979)) was designed to test the DEH in a
rather different fashion. The main finding of these studies is that large
increases or decreases in concentration are associated with above-average
increases in productivity. While this is certainly consistent with the
DEH, it is not inconsistent with the DCH. After all, one does not expect
to see major changes in seller concentration under plausible variants of
either hypothesis except in response to major alterations in competitive
relationships. Major innovations, which are likely to be followed by an
increase in the innovator's market share under almost any plausible
hypothesis about market behavior, are an important source of such
alterations. Innovations by market leaders should thus tend to be
associated with increases in both concentration and industry productivity
under either the DEH or the DCH. Innovations by new entrants or small
firms should tend to lower concentration while raising average
productivity. Industries in which little innovation occurs are likely to
exhibit stable concentration along with below-average gains in
productivity. (Note also that Peltzman (1977) finds evidence in support
'of the DCH assertion that increases in concentration lead to increases in
price -- cost margins.)
3. This model has been used by Clarke and Davies (1982) to analyze the
determinants of equilibrium concentration in the presence of efficiency
differences; see also Long (1982) and Clarke, Davies, and Waterson (1984)
for further development and empirical applications. The more complex DEH
models of Jovanovic (1982), Lippman and Rumelt (1982), and Telser (1982)
stress the dynamic mechanisms determining N and the c rather than
equilibrium and do not lend themselves readily to use in empirical
analysis. In the Cournot model in the text, the larger is N, the smaller
the differences among the c that are consistent with non-negative market
shares. If the market demand curve is P = a - bQ, for instance, non-
negative shares require c [a + (N-1)J,]/N for all i, where is the
average of all c's except cl.
4. To see this last point, suppose, in the spirit of the more complex DEH
models cited in footnote 3, that in order to enter any particular
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industry, firms must spend some industry-specific amount on research and
development. This allows them in effect to draw a value of c from the
industry-specific distribution of possible unit costs. Firms that draw a
high c will elect not to start up production, while lucky firms with low
c's will enter and earn positive rents on their luck. Depending on the
pattern of differences in R&D costs and distributions of possible c's
across industries, one might expect industries that attract relatively few
firms to draw costs or to enter (and are thus concentrated ex post) to
produce substantial rents to all those lucky enough to be able to operate
profitably.
5. But see Spiller and Favaro (1984) for an apparent counterexample.
6. On the necessity of using substantial inter-period gaps in the analysis of
structural change, see, for instance, the discussion of concentration
changes by Caves and Porter (1980, esp. p. 9). It should be noted that
Demsetz (1974) has argued that 1963 is an outlier that is somewhat less
consistent with the DEH than surrounding years, though the statistical
analysis that supports his argument is suspect because it is based on
absolute fire size rather than market share. (See Daskin (1983) for a
general discussion of this issue.)
7. All data used in this and the next paragraph come from the 1984 Economic
Reogrt of the President. Growth rates reported for any year T are are the
annual rates of growth experienced between (T-1) and (T+1). This
procedure better reflects growth during the second half of each year than
the usual approach of reporting changes from the previous year.
8. To investigate the intertemporal stability of R and CONC, equations of the
form X(1972)-X(1963)] = [ - X(1963)] were estimated for each variable.
(More complex specifications, in which , , or both were functions of
other variables, generally did not perform noticeably better.) Estimates
of I indicate a half-life of deviations of R from the mean (=
9.0x[ln(0.5)/ln(1-)], the equation's median lag in years) of 8.8 years,
with an asymptotic standard error of 2.1 years. CONC also tends to
regress toward the mean in these data, but the process seems much slower;
the estimated half-life of deviations from the mean is 19.9 years, with an
asymptotic standard error of 6.6 years. It is unclear exactly how to
interpret this difference in adjustment speeds, especially in light of the
differences in patterns of profitability between the 1963 and 1972 samples
that are discussed in Sections IV - VI. The implications of this
difference for choice between the DEH and the DCH are in any case not
obvious.
9. Previous studies using IRS data from the early 1960's (e.g., Comanor and
Wilson (1974) and Porter (1979)) typically have many more consumer goods
industries. A good deal of the difference is accounted for by aggregation
from 1963 to 1972 industries and the deletion of some of the latter. But
a detailed comparison reveals that a number of industries generally
classified as producing mainly consumer goods in earlier studies in fact
generate the majority of their value-added in four-digit industries that
Ornstein (1977, Appendix B) classifies as producer goods industries.
Examples include IRS minor industries 2850 (Paints and allied products),
3010 (Rubber products), and 3420 (Cutlery, hand tools, and hardware).
__*_1__IL(·l__l_ ..1__1__.-_..·..
III
- 42 -
10. Since R is known, the sampling variance of RA is equal to the square of
the standard error of A. Similarly, since 1963 and 1972 can be treated as
providing independent observations, sampling variances of changes in
parameters between these two years are sums of the corresponding squared
standard errors.
11. There is, of course, no guarantee that the tj are homoscedastic in fact.
In particular, differences in the numbers and relative sizes of economic
markets included in different IRS industries will induce
heteroscedasticity, as will various differences among the basic markets
themselves. As is usual in applied work, homoscedasticity is assumed here
simply because it is unclear how to obtain plausible estimates of the
pattern of heteroscedasticity.
12. The equations involving R (Table 3) and R (Table 5) showed signs of
coefficient instability between consumer and producer goods industries.
But since these equations play no direct role in our comparisons of the
DEH and the DCH, the sources of this instability were not explored.
13. A number of authors including Ravenscraft (1983) and Schmalensee (1985)
have found highly significant relations between share and profitability in
models in which the coefficient of share is constrained to be the same
across industries. (See Scherer (1980, ch. 9) for a discussion of earlier
work of this sort.) The tests of coefficient equality in Table 2 indicate
that this constraint is highly suspect. Profitability is apparently
strongly related to market share in some industries, but not in all.
14. Aggregate time series for durable and nondurable goods industries do not
reveal differences substantial enough to suggest obvious explanations
based on either standard cyclical arguments or the findings reported in
Appendix A. Real NP growth (computed as per footnote 7) in 1963 was 8.6%
for durables and 11.4% for nondurables. The 1972 figures were 6.4% and
9.0%. The corresponding figures for growth in the implicit 6NP deflator
were -1.2% and -0.6% for 1963 and 1.2% and -0.9% for 1972. Rates of
growth of average hourly gross earnings per production or nonsupervisory
worker (from Business Statistics: 1982) were 2.7% for both groups of
industries in 1963, 7.0% for durables in 1972, and 6.4% for nondurables in
1972. (All these series are based on more precise divisions between
durable and nondurable goods industries than could be employed with IRS
data.) It has been suggested to me that an explanation of the
durable/nondurable instability could be constructed out of cross-sectional
differences in the incidence of unionization, coupled with changes in
union behavior over time between 1963 and 1972. A serious attempt to
construct such an explanation would carry me far beyond the bounds of the
present study, however.
15. Interest payments by manufacturing firms in this size class were not
published for 1962. A quadratic fit to the ratio of interest payments by
these firms to interest payments by all manufacturing firms over the
periods 1958-1961 and 1963-1970 had an R2 of .975 and a Durbin-Watson of
1.76. This equation was used to estimate interest payments by
manufacturing firms in this size class in 1962.
Table 1
Main Industry-Level Variables
1963 1972 1963-1972
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Correlation
R .1028 .0352 .0995 .0299 .5802
CONC .3353 .1572 .3606 .1511 .7602
AD/K .0270 .0326 .0197 .0226 .8302
PQ/K 1.5837 .6310 1.4086 .4502 .8764
Note. -- See text for sources and definitions.
III
Table 2
Summary Statistics from Intra-Industry Regressions
Coefficient/Specification
A/CRS A/IRS RA/CRS RA/IRS B/CRS B/IRS
Statistics for 1963
Sample Coefficients
Sample Mean .0910 .0955 .0118 .0077 .4823 .1747
Standard Deviation .0322 .0296 .0416 .0322 1.7599 .9397
Number Positive 69 70 39 40 42 40
Mean t-Statistic 11.2 7.27 1.27 0.64 0.31 0.89
Mean Itl-Statistic 11.2 7.27 3.35 1.68 0.76 2.29
Population Estimates
Estimated Mean .0919 .0929 .0114 .0077 * .1359
Standard Deviation .0275 .0220 .0381 .0254 * .4391
Probability Levels
Coefficients = 0 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .18 <.01
Coefficients Equal <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .29 <.01
Population Mean = 0 <.01 <.01 .02 .03 * .03
Statistics for 1972
Sample Coefficients
Sample Mean .1118 .1079 -.0123 -.0084 -.3554 -.3532
Standard Deviation .0253 .0273 .0350 .0325 .8492 1.0839
Number Positive 70 70 19 24 23 24
Mean t-Statistic 18.0 12.8 -2.00 -0.99 -0.32 -1.18
Mean ItI-Statistic 18.0 12.8 4.31 2.83 0.83 3.45
Population Estimates
Estimated Mean .1121 .1077 -.1249 -.0079 * -.2586
Standard Deviation .0228 .0242 .0332 .0300 * 1.0119
Probability Levels
Coefficients = 0 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .08 <.01
Coefficients Equal <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .08 <.01
Population Mean = 0 <.01 <.01 <.01 .04 * .04
Changes, 1963 to 1972
Sample Coefficients
Sample Mean .0208 .0128 -.0241 -.0162 -.8377 -.5279
Standard Deviation .0323 .0336 .0372 .0330 1.8832 1.5400
Number Positive 53 49 15 20 18 19
Mean t-Statistic 1.86 0.87 -2.06 -1.09 -0.45 -1.44
Mean ItI-Statistic 2.34 1.50 2.04 1.69 0.67 .29
Population Estimates
Estimated Mean .0211 .0135 -.0245 -.0170 * -.3731
Standard Deviation .0253 .0241 .0314 .0289 * 1.2373
Probability Levels
Coefficients = 0 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .97 <.01
Coefficients Equal <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 .99 <.01
Population Mean 0 <.01 <.01 <.01 <.01 * .02
*Could not be computed because estimated population variance was negative.
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Table 5
Correlates of 1963-1972 Changes in Average and
Estimated Zero-Share Profitability*
Dependent Variable
AR AA/Pooled AA/CRS AA/IRS
Basic Model
CONC -.0905 -.0518 -.0500 -.0573
(3.96) (2.88) (2.02) (2.02)
R2-Wtd. - .057 .057 .057
-Raw .187 .068 .090 .049
Full Model
DDUR -.0201 -.0508 -.0517 -.0531
(0.55) (1.74) (1.27) (1.26)
DNDR .0186 .0445 .0560 .0325
(1.20) (4.20) (3.82) (2.12)
CONC -.0801 -.0355 -.0411 -.0270
(3.15) (1.89) (1.59) (0.99)
AD/K -.0429 -.2797 -.1585 -.4562
(0.32) (2.89) (1.25) (3.07)
DDUR*PQ/K .0351 .0615 .0642 .0607
(1.42) (3.05) (2.27) (2.11)
DNDR*PQ/K .0044 -.0046 -.0098 .0009
(0.61) (0.99) (1.54) (0.13)
R2-Wtd. - .179 .190 .219
-Raw .217 .169 .168 .197
P-Levels:
CNST & PQ/K Equal .45 <.01 .03 .11
CONC & AD/K Equal .17 .38 .24 .40
All Coeffs Equal .27 <.01 .04 .18
*Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics.
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Table 6
Correlates of Estimated 1963-1972 Changes in
Large Firm vs. Small Firm Differentials
Dependent Variable
ARA/Pooled ARA/CRS ARA/IRS AB/Pooled AB/CRS AB/IRS
Basic Model
CONC -.0455 -.0439 -.0472 .9003 .5074 1.078
(2.27) (1.46) (1.75) (2.00) (0.86) (1.62)
R2-Wtd. .036 .031 .043 .028 .011 .037
-Raw .010 -.002 .026 .009 -.034 .039
Full Model
Durables:
CNST .0934 .0657 .1152 2.936 2.339 3.118
(2.74) (1.24) (2.34) (2.82) (1.33) (2.02)
CONC -.1394 -.1087 -.1638 -1.305 -1.059 -1.428
(4.14) (2.07) (3.40) (1.23) (0.61) (0.90)
AD/K 1.824 2.026 1.690 21.40 20.67 21.92
(3.90) (2.95) (2.38) (1.92) (1.10) (1.34)
PQ/K -.0642 -.0579 -.0694 -2.158 -1.827 -2.245
(3.19) (1.87) (2.38) (3.13) (1.44) (2.25)
R2-Wtd. .572 .552 .617 .305 .245 .326
-Raw .355 .328 .424 .286 .208 .327
Nondurables:
CNST -.0377 -.0492 -.0291 -1.272 -1.362 -1.257
(2.88) (2.47) (1.68) (4.54) (3.44) (3.05)
CONC -.0079 -.0055 -.0118 1.141 1.119 1.186
(0.31) (0.15) (0.35) (2.33) (1.78) (1.60)
AD/K .1425 .0032 .2845 5.377 4.140 5.943
(1.28) (0.02) (1.84) (2.58) (1.54) (1.91)
PQ/K .0105 .0161 .0062 .1710 .2262 .1508
(1.97) (2.00) (0.88) (1.59) (1.67) (0.92)
R2-Wtd. .070 .089 .100 .144 .142 .150
-Raw .053 .053 .088 .042 .030 .063
P-Level:
Slopes = <.01 .01 .01 .05 .07 .05
All Coeffs = <.01 .01 .01 <.01 .06 .03
*Figures in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics.
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